compared with the Agency sub-sample. In addition, part of the contact information provided by the BvD was not up-to-date which meant the survey never reached some firms.
Chart 3: Response rates for Agency sample Chart 4: Response rates for the BvD sample
Most of the questions were answered, with the overall question-specific response rate at around 90%. Some questions, though, particularly on the proportion of wage freezes and cuts, were not well answered. This could have been because such information was difficult or too sensitive to obtain. In terms of timing, 70-80% of the responses were received within two weeks. Chart 5 shows the cumulative proportion of responses over time. It took around five to six weeks for all the respondents to reply. Several consistency checks were performed to improve the quality of the data. They ensured the answers were logically coherent and any errors in responses were corrected. This resulted in improved quality of the underlying data.
Chart 5: Timing of responses
The final sample is broadly representative of the UK private sector. Table A compares the final sample to GVA shares of each industry. It indicates the sample is fairly balanced. Table B compares the employment shares by each industry and firm size (1-49, 50-149, 250+ employees) . It shows that the final sample is somewhat overweight in manufacturing and business services. It also suggests that larger firms in the final sample represent a larger share of employment than in the population. This comes at the expense of smaller firms which are underweight.
Staff Working Paper No. 568 December 2015 In order to account for the unequal probabilities of the firms being selected into the gross sample as well as the differing response rates, both firm-based and employment based weights were constructed. This was done using the methodology adopted by the WDN in their previous surveys. More details can be found in Appendix B. In practice, for most of the qualitative questions unweighted and weighted responses are equivalent. But when analysing quantitative questions in what follows, we use the weighted data.
A more detailed analysis of final sample characteristics, based on weighted responses, is comparable to population characteristics on a number of dimensions. Table C provides an overview of the sample. Further comparisons suggest that the final weighted sample is broadly representative of the UK private sector and can serve as a useful basis for analysis.
Results from the survey
During 2010-2013, the UK economy experienced a modest recovery in output while employment strongly increased. As a result, productivity growth was weak over that period. In addition, and as we said earlier, real wages fell over this period. Uncertainty seemed to abate slowly but credit conditions remained difficult especially for smaller firms. The evolution of productivity and real wages over this period represented a departure from previous economic relationships. So, understanding the sources and size of shocks as perceived by firms, as well as their responses to such shocks during that period, might provide insights as to why productivity and real wages were so weak.
Changes in the economic environment
The WDN survey asked firms about how they experienced a number of different changes in the economic environment. Most firms reported an increase in nominal demand, consistent with the aggregate data. A large part of the increase in demand occurred through a rise in domestic volumes and a little less through domestic prices. An increase in the volume of foreign demand played a less important role, which is consistent with the modest recovery in UK exports over this period. Demand also increased through foreign prices although this tended to play the smallest role in the recovery probably due to a more competitive environment for those firms that export their goods and services abroad. As is well known, the financial crisis was associated with restricted access to, in particular, bank finance and a general increase in uncertainty. Given that, it is interesting that Chart 6 suggests that only a minority of firms reported that uncertainty decreased, and that access to external financing through the usual channels rose, between 2010 and 2013. Most firms reported no change which suggests that, on balance, uncertainty and credit conditions remained at levels experienced in 2010. That is, despite the economy growing, the tightness in credit conditions and increase uncertainty remained. However, this varied by firm size: larger firms tended to report, on balance, an improvement in access to external finance while small firms tended to report, on balance, a worsening in access to external finance. This is in line with aggregate measures showing that firms were raising about £1 billion a month of net finance by issuing capital (the main source of external funding for large firms) over this period whereas bank lending (the main source of external funding for small firms) was falling.
Most firms reported a strong increase in the availability of inputs through the usual suppliers. On the face of it, this result looks surprising, particularly when compared with the responses to the same question in other countries. Digging deeper into the data, we found that this strong increase in the availability of inputs was most marked among smaller and medium-sized firms. This is suggestive that suppliers -particularly those supplying smaller and medium-sized firms -were hit particularly hard during the recession. Hence, as they recovered coming out of the recession, the firms they supplied to saw a strong increase in the availability of supplies. Those firms that reported a strong change in economic conditions also tended to think these changes were partly or fully permanent.
When asked about credit conditions in more detail, only a minority of firms reported difficulties in accessing credit, whether it was the inability to access credit at all or obtaining it at a sufficiently acceptable price and/or conditions (Chart 8). This differed by size of firm in the cases of price and conditions being too onerous for obtaining working capital and financing new investment: SMEs tended to experience more difficulties than larger firms and this difference was statistically significant. 1 This result is also partly corroborated by Bank of England (2013) and is, again, likely to result from the fact that small firms tend to rely on bank lending whereas larger firms tend to have multiple sources of financing including capital markets as well as banking relationships in other countries.
Chart 8: Credit conditions in 2010-2013
Chart 9: Changes in costs Over this period, firms' costs changed as well. Chart 9 suggests that most firms experienced a moderate increase in total costs over the period 2010-13 and this increase had been fairly evenly spread across different sub-components of total costs. Interestingly, Chart 10 suggests that larger firms tended to report a fall in other costs. Given that -as shown in Chart 11 -firms tend to cite rent and rates, insurance, utilities and fuel as being their main other costs, this result suggests that large firms have been able to take more advantage of the falls in energy costs than smaller firms.
Chart 10: Changes in costs by firm size Chart 11: Types of other costs 8 An interesting question is the extent to which costs are related to economic conditions. In particular, New Keynesian theory suggests that inflation is driven by real marginal cost, which itself rises when demand is rising relative to supply. One way of using the WDN survey data to look at how costs might be related to changes in economic factors is to examine the correlations between them. Table D reports Spearman's rank correlation coefficients between total costs and economic factors. Statistically significant coefficients are highlighted in red. The level of demand seems to be positively correlated with most of the changes in firms' total costs although the correlations are not very high. This suggests that over 2010-2013, increases in demand seem to have been associated with increases in costs, in line with the theory. Surprisingly, access to external financing also seems positively correlated with labour costs. It may just be that firms that have experienced an improvement in access to finance also saw a positive change in demand and labour costs. In terms of financing costs, two factors were statistically significant. Customers' ability to pay was negatively correlated with financing costs, presumably because an increase in the time taken for invoices to be paid and/or a need to firms to be more flexible in their charging for goods/services would create more reliance on working capital finance. The availability of inputs, however, seems to be positively correlated with financing costs. This might suggest that firms are using finance to help buy inputs. If this is the case, one would expect the two to increase together. Of course, with all the pairwise correlations in Table D , it is more than possible that some of them are driven by common factors and there is no sense in which we can say any variable is 'causing' any other variable. Focusing more specifically on how labour costs evolved, there was some variation in firms' responses. Most firms reported a moderate increase in base wages and a strong increase in other labour costs. These were probably the most important components accounting for the moderate increases in total labour costs (Chart 12). Alongside base wage increases, firms experienced moderate increases in flexible wage components such as bonuses and other discretionary compensation. On balance, firms increased the number of permanent workers and, to a lesser extent, temporary and agency workers. There was a relatively smaller rise in working hours. Medium-size and larger firms were more likely to report increasing working hours (Chart 13). The strong increases in other labour costs were most prevalent for SMEs rather than large firms. These other labour costs amounted to just over 18% of total labour costs over the 2010-13 period. The firms in our survey most often cited pensions when asked to specify other labour costs (Chart 14), which suggests that the strong increase in these costs was associated with a rise in the cost of providing pensions to their staff. This increase in pension costs came from two sources. First, low gilt yields since the Great Recession would have widened deficits in definedbenefit (DB) pension schemes. These deficits would have had to have been plugged by increased firm contributions to such schemes, and ONS self-administered pension fund survey data indicate that special contributions to private and public-funded DB schemes were particularly high in 2012 and 2013. Second, auto-enrolment of employees without workplace pension provision into qualifying pension schemes began in 2012 Q4. This means that employers must make minimum pension contributions -currently 1% of earnings -in respect of eligible employees' earnings. The fact that the word 'Auto' appears fairly clearly in Chart 14 suggests that this was an issue for at least some of the firms in our survey.
Again, it is interesting to see how changes in the economic environment are correlated with changes in labour cost components. The WDN survey results are shown in Table E . The level of demand is positively correlated with most labour cost components suggesting firms that see an increase in demand expand output and increase their inputs, thereby also increasing labour costs. Other labour costs seem to be negatively correlated with the level of demand. This probably reflects the fact that pension costs rose partly on account of the low interest rates that responded to low demand and partly for exogenous reasons (discussed above) at the same time as demand was low. Uncertainty seems to be positively correlated with growth in base wages per hour, possibly suggesting that firms are insuring their workers against this, as suggested by some efficiency wage models. Interestingly, changes in customers' ability to pay were positively correlated with the number of permanent employees and working hours, suggesting that when firms saw their customers spending more, they took this as a sign to increase employment. As might be expected, an increased supply of non-labour inputs was negatively correlated with the demand for permanent employees, temporary employees and working hours since these will be substitutes for each other. 
Chart 14: Types of other labour costs

Methods of adjustment
The flexible structure of the UK labour market will likely have played a role in how firms adjust to changes in the economic environment. In order to investigate this, the WDN survey asked a series of questions on how firms experienced downward labour adjustment in terms of factors related to the structure of the labour market. We investigate this issue in two steps. First we ask what factors influenced those firms who strongly adjusted their labour input downwards. Second, conditional on there being a downward adjustment, we examine what factors affect the methods of adjustment used.
Around 22% of firms reported that they needed to significantly reduce their labour input over the period 2010-13. These firms significantly differed from other firms which did not have to significantly reduce their labour input, seeing weaker demand on balance. Using a simple regression, Chart 15 summarises which characteristics increased the probability of a significant downward labour adjustment. We found that a strong increase in volatility would increase the probability of a downward adjustment around 20%, similar in magnitude to a strong decrease in demand. The presence of a union would also increase the likelihood of a significant downward adjustment. This could be perhaps because unions might resist smaller changes in pay and/or employment until the need for a substantial adjustment arises. Also, the inability to lower nominal wages is an important factor contributing to a likelihood of a significant downward labour input adjustment. The data suggests a similar type of effect, around 10%, for foreign ownership. This could be due to a form of home bias, a tendency to adjust first in locations not in the home country. Interestingly, the simple results also indicate that firms operating in a single location, as opposed to multiple locations, seemed less likely to require a significant reduction in labour input. Having examined what factors cause firms to adjust their labour input downwards, we next look at how they go about this adjustment. The survey suggests that when adjusting their labour input downward, firms used a combination of strategies: the most prevalent being individual redundancies and some form of a hiring freeze (non-renewal of temporary contracts and reduction of new hires) as shown in Chart 16. Collective redundancies were used moderately. Some firms also reported reducing agency workers and other external contractors while a few also chose to reduce working hours. Among the firms that adjusted moderately or a lot, most used one to four instruments. These were a combination of all the instruments discussed above, although no dominant strategy emerged. Firms seemed to mix and match different methods of adjusting their labour input downward. Note: the questions referred to factors that depend on rules and procedures rather than the state of the labour market
To explore which firm characteristics might lead to different adjustment strategies, conditional on the firm having reduced labour input, we ran a few simple regressions. For each of the adjustment channels, we tried to explain whether a firm had used it or not by a number of firm characteristics. We did not include an indicator of demand in this analysis, given that we would expect demand to determine whether or not firms adjust their labour input at all, rather than how they might adjust. That said, in future work we hope to use the results from the WDN survey across many countries to examine whether the extent of any change in demand is related to the method of adjustment used.
2 Table F below shows the results of these individual probit regressions. Statistically significant marginal effects (at the mean) are given in colour where red indicates a negative effect and green a positive effect. In terms of the main channels of adjustment used, collective redundancies tended to be used more by larger firms and those with many offices. Individual redundancies were more likely to be used by older firms. Firms with downwardly rigid nominal wages were also more likely to use individual redundancies as a means of adjusting their labour input downwards. The presence of downward nominal wage rigidity was also positively associated with a freeze/reduction of new hires. But firms with one office and firms in construction were less likely to adjust their labour force in this manner. Interestingly, foreignowned firms were more likely to move work overseas to either their offices or another company than domestically-owned firms were. Note: coloured cells indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. Green indicates a positive coefficient and red a negative one. The marginal effects indicate an impact on the likelihood of using a particular adjustment method for a unit change in each explanatory variable at its mean.
While the range of strategies used by UK firms might suggest the labour market is relatively flexible, the survey also asked how firms perceived changes in institutional features of the labour market. Chart 17 reports the net balances across a range of different factors. On balance, firms perceived the labour market to be more rigid. But this was mostly concentrated in two areas. Almost 30% of firms found hiring employees more difficult in 2013 than in 2010, a little over 20% of firms also found lowering wages at which they hire more difficult and around 10% of firms, on balance, reported that they also found adjusting wages of existing workers more difficult in 2013 than in 2010.
Given there were no obvious institutional changes in the UK labour market, these results seem surprising. One possible explanation is that firms responded to the question based on their experience of labour market conditions in 2013 vs. 2010, and simply failed to read or take in the 2 See Bertola et al. (2012) for a similar exercise using a previous wave of the WDN survey.
Staff Working Paper No. 568 December 2015 13 part of the question that said: 'The questions refer to factors that depend on rules and procedures rather than the state of the labour market'. This seems to be borne out by the answers to the question on the main obstacles to hiring new workers.
There could be many obstacles to hiring new workers but UK firms cited a few factors as being particularly relevant. Chart 18 reports that in 2013, 60% of firms reported that insufficient skills were an obstacle to hiring new permanent workers. Around 40% indicated that uncertainty prevented them from hiring. And around a quarter said that high wages for new workers were a problem.
Chart 18: Obstacles to hiring workers on an open-ended, permanent contract
To sum up this section, although firms tend to use a combination of strategies to adjust their labour inputs downwards, it is clear that the availability of suitable and 'cheap' workers became more of an issue for UK firms that wanted to adjust their labour input upwards. This could perhaps be a reason why net migration to the United Kingdom remained relatively robust despite there being slack in the labour market during this period.
Wage-setting and wage dynamics
Another important margin of adjustment for firms, when responding to shocks, is the ability to change wages. So, the ability to adjust to competing demand and cost pressures will also depend on features of the wage-setting process. In this sub-section, we consider the questions of how often wages are set before going on to examine downward nominal and real wage rigidity.
The frequency at which firms change wages will affect the flexibility with which they can react to shocks. In particular, the more often firms change wages, the more opportunities there are to adjust wages to unexpected economic developments. In the United Kingdom, most firms tend to review wages once a year and around a quarter of them change wages less frequently than that. The median frequency of wage-setting is annual with the exception of construction where it is between one and two years. Across firm size, the median frequency was also annual but smaller firms reported a broader range of wage-setting frequencies (Chart 19). While around 80% of large firms tend to change wages once a year, only 50% of smaller firms do so with almost a quarter of them changing less frequently than once every two years. This could suggest wage-setting is more rigid in smaller firms although this could be offset by greater flexibility in wage growth, ie, if wage changes are more variable than in larger firms.
The presence of unions in wage bargaining can also introduce less flexibility in wage-setting. In the survey, unions only cover around 12% of employees. They tend to be present at the level of the firm and, on average, cover around two-thirds of employees in the firms where they are present. But the aggregate wage-setting picture is not that different between firms with and without a union presence (Chart 20). Often unions tend to negotiate for real wages by focusing on inflationary pressures. The survey asked whether firms directly and explicitly linked changes in base wages to inflation. Around 30% of firms overall reported that they did. For those firms where there was a union presence, this number was 38%, but the difference was not statistically significant. In both cases, this is indicative of some downward real wage rigidity.
Chart 19: Distribution of wage-setting frequencies
Chart 20: Distribution of wage-setting frequencies
During 2010-2013, many firms had to adjust wages downwards. In the absence of downward wage rigidity, this means that the distribution of wage changes should be symmetric. Using employee-level data, Chart 21 shows that this is not the case for the growth in nominal pay per hour. There is a clear spike at zero and an absence of mass to the left of zero. This is indicative of downward nominal wage rigidity. WDN survey evidence corroborates this picture. According to the survey, the overall incidence of wage freezes was relatively high at around 25% in 2010 although by 2014 this had fallen to around 10%. Chart 22 shows the sectoral variation among firms. The incidence of pay freezes was highest among firms in construction and lowest among firms in finance. On average, a pay freeze would last around two and a half years but for around a quarter of the firms it lasted at least three years. Pay freezes lasted the longest in construction, almost an average of three years. In contrast, firms reported only a handful of wage cuts. Anecdotally, where they did cut wages, the median wage cut ranged from 2.5% to 25%. In understanding how wages respond to shocks, it is important to understand which factors might account for the high incidence of wage freezes we saw just after the financial crisis and the lower number of freezes seen more recently. In order to assess which factors might determine the likelihood of a pay freeze, we again estimate multivariate probit regressions. The implicit assumption is that a pay freeze is a proxy for downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). The approach adopted is similar to Babecky et al. (2010) . We use a probit model to explain the likelihood of a pay freeze occurring in a firm. Since some of the questions refer to 2010-2013, we construct a new pay freeze variable. We define the firm as having a pay freeze if there are two or more years (out of four) where it had a pay freeze. On this definition, around 40% of firms in the sample have had a pay freeze during 2010-2013. But, for robustness, we also run the same regressions on pay freeze variables for each year. We omit wage cuts from our analysis since they rarely occurred and we do not have enough data for statistical analysis.
The determinants of DNWR are taken from theory. Babecky et al. (2010) provide a summary of different theories that suggest why firms with certain characteristics might be more/less likely to have rigid wages. For example, the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) , the giftexchange model of Akerlof (1982) and the fair wage-effort hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen (1990) imply that wages might be more rigid for highly skilled workers. Lindbeck and Snower's (1998) insider-outsider theory suggests that insiders, such as those with long tenure or permanent contracts, might have more power over outsiders, which would lead to more wage rigidity. The presence of unions in wage bargaining might also lead to more downward wage rigidity (see Oswald, 1986 ).
The marginal effects of the probit model, using the 2010-2013 pay freeze variable as the dependent variable, are presented in Table G . Highlighted rows indicate statistically significant marginal effects at the 10% level. The model suggests that firms in construction were around 22% more likely to have a pay freeze relative to firms in finance (omitted category). This was also the case for smaller firms relative to larger firms although the effect was much smaller and not significant in 2013. These results are both in line with the descriptive evidence presented above. A decrease in access to external financing, a proxy for credit conditions, mostly appears to increase the likelihood of a pay preeze by 16-17% relative to a baseline of no change. Interestingly, in 2012 firms that reported a moderate increase in access to external financing were also slightly more likely to experience a pay freeze. This might suggest that in 2012 other factors, not accounted for in the simple model, might have been important. For example, firms could have reported an increase in access but might have been unwilling to increase their financing for other reasons. Increases in other economic factors, such as volatility, customers' ability to pay and demand tended to have large impacts on the probability of a pay freeze. But a moderate decrease in volatility, relative to no change, was also found to positively contribute to the likelihod of a pay freeze. This merits further investigation. The UK WDN survey evidence found some support for some of the theoretical arguments for wage rigidity. For example, the presence of a union was found to have a large negative impact of the likelihood of a pay freeze. Tenure or skills did not seem to have much explanatory power. But the share of permanent employees and labour costs expressed as a proportion of total costs (a proxy for capital intensity) were found to be significant in 2012 and 2013. A one percentage point increase in the share of permanent workers would have increased the probability of a pay freeze by 0.08%. This runs counter to theoretical predictions. It might point to a compromise between workers and management that reduced wages instead of jobs in order to reduce labour costs. But it is unclear whether this was an important factor; this effect was only significant in 2012 and was quantitatively small. The model also suggests that higher the share of labour costs, the more likely is a pay freeze to occur in a firm. Here too, the marginal effect is quite small. But it supports the theoretical argument put forward by Howitt (2002) which suggests that firms with high labour costs are less likely to lower wages since this would result in lost profits due to a 'disgruntled' workforce.
Many firms did not have pay freezes but experienced positive wage increases. But, given our survey, we can also measure downward real wage rigidity (DRWR). In particular, we asked whether firms directly and explicitly linked changes in base wages to inflation over the period 2010-13. We use the same setup as above. Our dependent variable takes the value of unity if the firms answered 'Yes' and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are similar. firms that have seen a strong recovery in demand were able to explicitly link wage growth to inflation. Also, the share of workers with more than five years of tenure is positively associated with DRWR. This would be in line with the predictions of Lindbeck and Snower (1998) , where insiders have more bargaining power than outsiders and are more likely to resist any falls in real wages.
There is some further survey evidence to support the insider-outsider argument. When asked, around 60% of firms stated that the labour cost of a new worker was similar to that of a comparable existing worker. In line with Akerlof and Yellen (1990) , the reasons given by those firms were mostly that any differences would be perceived as unfair by existing employees and that it would generate pay pressure from existing employees (Chart 23). The third most important reason cited was that any differences would have a negative impact on employees' work effort, in line with the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . This result is also important in the context of the wider debate over the flexibility of the wages of newly-employed workers. Our results suggest that these are fairly 'sticky', which is important in enabling search and matching models to generate volatility in the unemployment rate.
While there is evidence of DNWR and DRWR among UK firms operating during the period 2010-13, our quantitative analysis did not reveal many reasons why they might be present. But we asked those firms that did not cut wages why they did not do so. Some of the most common answers were that the most productive workers would leave and that outside wage options act as a constraint on pay. (See Chart 24.) Also, firms placed an emphasis on morale and employee effort. This evidence supports the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and the fair wage-effort hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen (1990) . In contrast, comparatively less importance was placed on implicit wage contracts, ie, firms 'smoothing' through wage changes because their workers are risk averse and like wage stability. Also, perhaps unsurprisingly given the low union density in the United Kingdom, regulations and collective agreements were less important reasons for not cutting wages.
Chart 23: Reasons why labour costs of new workers are the same as those of comparable existing workers Chart 24: Reasons why firms did not cut wages 4 Conclusions
The behaviour of the UK labour market during the Great Recession and in the subsequent recovery has been surprising. Despite a fall in output of 6.0% from peak to trough, the unemployment rate only rose by 3.3 percentage points, and had fallen back to roughly its precrisis level by the beginning of 2015. At the same time, real wages fell by just under 10%. This made it propitious that -as part of the WDN -the Bank of England carried out a wage-setting survey covering the period from 2010-13. Not only did the survey provide an opportunity to assess how firms in the United Kingdom responded to the financial crisis, but it presented an opportunity to understand wage-setting in the UK context more broadly.
In this paper we have set out the main lessons learnt from this survey. Over the 2010-13 period, most firms experienced an increase in demand and a moderate increase in costs as the economy recovered from the Great Recession. Most firms reported an increase in labour costs coming from increases in base wages and increased employment of permanent workers and, to a lesser extent, temporary and agency workers. Firms were able to use a combination of strategies to adjust their labour inputs downwards, the most prevalent being individual redundancies and some form of a hiring freeze (non-renewal of temporary contracts and reduction of new hires), but those firms increasing their labour input found problems with the availability of suitable workers. This could perhaps be a reason why net migration to the United Kingdom remained relatively robust despite there being slack in the labour market during this period.
In terms of the frequency with which wages are set, we found the median frequency of wagesetting to be annual in all sectors apart from construction, where it is between one and two years. Around 30% of firms reported that they directly and explicitly related changes in their base wage to inflation, suggesting that there is likely some downward real wage rigidity. That said, the aggregate behaviour of real wages would suggest that this was not a limiting factor during the 2010-13 period. Downward nominal wage rigidity, on the other hand, was possibly more important with around 25% of firms freezing wages in 2010, although by 2014 this had fallen to around 10%. The survey suggested that 'efficiency wage' theories of wage rigidity based around the ability of workers to 'shirk' and the importance workers attach to being paid a 'fair' wage explained why firms were reluctant to cut wages. Looking forward, the key question is whether the presence of these rigidities on the way down might limit, or slow down, rises in wages on the way up. 
Section 2 Changes in the economic environment
This section aims at assessing the main changes in economic environment your firm experienced during 2010-2013 . When answering the questions please refer to "the most significant changes" taking place over this period. This section could best be answered by the CEO or the Finance director. A box for additional comments is provided at the end of this section. A 'one-off' effect might be something that is temporary and disappears within a year. Effects that are partly permanent might last longer than a year but not more than two. While a permanent effect would be something structural and last longer than two years.
-
Please choose ONE option for each line if the factor strongly affected your firm. 3.6 -Which of the following measures did you use to reduce your labour input or alter its composition when it was most urgent? Regulations on dismissals/lay-offs (collective or individual) are those that impose legal restrictions on dismissals and set compensation to be paid to former employees being laid off. Temporary lay-offs (for economic reasons) concern both blue-collar and white-collar workers. Early retirement schemes are to be understood as measures allowing workers being made redundant to receive a monthly pension and /or lump sum payment before reaching the statutory retirement age. Please choose ONE option for each line. The questions refer to factors that depend on rules and procedures rather than the state of the labour market.
Please choose ONE option for each line. 
Much less difficult
